In that era "mixed children" were relatively rare among the native population, and even more so among the small educated minority. Other leading figures of his generation were almost all pure Minangkabau, unblemished Javanese, Sundanese from time out of mind, and so on. Perhaps only the peranakan [typically of mixed Chinese and native descent, and no longer familiar with any written Chinese] were then used to being "mixed," both by descent and by culture. One can guess that his family background allowed Bung Karno to liberate himself very quickly from all kinds of narrow-minded ethnicism, and thus to embrace a very broad conception of nationalism. Yet it is also likely that his "mixed origins" also opened his eyes to the need for the healthy development of the cultures and autonomies of the many regions in the gigantic archipelago we call Indonesia.
One other "chance" proved no less important. It is a historical irony that the marriage which gave birth to Bung Karo has today become-with the recent Marriage Law-if not quite an impossibility, certainly a big hassle.2 So one could say that the emergence of Bung Karo into this fleeting world was possible only in a period when syncretism was still the norm in the Archipelago, and there were as yet no high, forbidding walls between different social groups. A fine indication of the depth of this syncretism is that the abortive Communist uprising of 1926-27 exploded in Banten and West Sumatra, both famous for the Islamic piety of their populations. Hence the syncretistic features of Bung Karno's thinking were nothing out of the ordinary, but characterized most of the native cultures of Indonesia at that time.
To see just how crucial were the cultural norms of the Archipelago in that era for "making possible" Bung Kamo's political career, one has only to turn to the fate of Mahatma Gandhi and his Big Indian nationalism. Putting the matter quite crudely, one could say that Islam entered Big India on the sword-points of invaders from Afghanistan. From the thirteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century the most important kings and much of the ruling classes belonged to the Muslim minority, while the great majority of the common people remained Hindu. But British imperialism finally abolished the Muslim Mughal dynasty and gradually constructed a new political system based on electoral representation. Understandably these drastic changes angered the former ruling groups who feared losing all their privileges and becoming an ordinary minority. Here was the source of ever-increasing social antagonisms that in the end split Big India into two separate independent states, Smaller India and Pakistan, to the accompaniment of mass mutual slaughter between Muslims and Hindus. Although Gandhi was a good Hindu, he had a broad and humane vision, and did everything he could to prevent these calamities-with the result that he was assassinated by a fanatical terrorist who regarded the great man as a traitor to the Hindu community.
In Indonesia, on the other hand, Islam entered gradually, and, on the whole, peacefully, via individual preachers and seafaring traders. Gradually, too, the old Hindu-Buddhist monarchies disappeared, or converted to Islam, and the official institutions of the old religion vanished into the night. But in this centuries-long process, syncretism was always salient. Animistic and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs remained strong, as evidenced by the deep popularity, even today, of stories from the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, not only among the Javanese, but also among the Sundanese, Balinese, and Madurese, and even on the Malay Peninsula. The result of this steady syncretism was that there was no high religious wall separating rulers and ruled. In recruiting his armies, Prince Diponegoro could calmly utilize the symbols both of Islam and of Javanese mysticism. In the nineteenth century, only the bloody Paderi wars3 in West Sumatra were marked by adversaries of clearly antagonistic religious orientations. Thus it was that Bung Karno, at least in his salad days, could pursue his syncretic political vision, open to elements of all religions, without meeting the Mahatma's personal and political fate. To the last moment of his life, the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia remained firm.
Nonetheless, in the long run, the Indonesia of his youth could not escape changes which gradually undermined the old syncretic cultures. Social compartmentalization steadily increased. Both Muslim and Christian missionaries worked hard to eliminate everything that seemed to them "superstitious" residues from a "primitive" past. The rapidly expanding secular education system of the state also "cornered" and marginalized the older ways of seeing the world. As literacy spread, more and more people read printed tracts glorifying "international norms and criteria." The traditional kyai (learned Islamic scholars) were forced little by little to give way to journalists and other intellectuals espousing a modernist Islam purified of "superstition." Marxists too were more and more inclined to dispense with people like Hadji Misbach, Semaun, and Tan Malaka,4 and to follow either Moscow's or Peking's "international line." And in the era of Harto every Indonesian was legally compelled to adhere to a "religion with a Book" (i.e. internationally "standard"), while syncretic belief-systems were, so to speak, kicked out of the official arena.
3 Three Minangkabau pilgrims to Mecca, who happened to be in the city when it fell to the austere, fundamentalist Wahhabi movement at the end of the eighteenth century, became converted. On their return to West Sumatra in 1803 they began a three-decade long, partly successful, armed struggle to wipe out the syncretic Islam till then prevailing there.
Bung Karo struggled might and main to dam the tide of de-syncretization, but not always in a wise manner. In reaction to Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam rebellion,5 the horror of the Tjikini Affair,6 the deadlock in the Constituent Assembly,7 and the PRRI,8 Soekamo became increasingly suspicious of modernist Muslims, without sufficiently distinguishing between moderates and hardliners. On the other hand, he was fond of the Nahdlatul Ulama and its syncretistic Islam. The total ban he imposed on the Masyumi proved to be a rash and vain policy which had dire consequences in the longer run. Even in the case of the PKI, he was wary of standardization. He made the murdered Tan Malaka, bogeyman to Aidit's PKI, a National Hero.9 And in the last years of his rule, it became obvious that Bung Kamo particularly liked Njoto, whom he regarded as the most flexible and "syncretistic" of the PKI leaders. Rumor even had it that he wanted Njoto (who was then facing serious trouble inside his party10) to start a new Marxist (syncretic-nationalist) party in competition with the "standardized" PKI. Yet in the end all these endeavors collapsed in the catastrophe of 1965-66, which reminds us of the catastrophe experienced by Gandhi twenty years earlier.
All the same, we must also bear in mind that although Bung Kamo was a legatee of the old, indigenous syncretism, he was also a modem politician, with the consequence that in his hands syncretism took on a new form, a good deal less syncretistic than its forerunners. This transformation is quite plain in his justly famous colonial-era work, Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. The title itself, let alone the content, shows that in his eyes Islam and Marxism were "boxes," in other words, walled communities. Thus Islam was just that, Islam, without any local variations, Marxism was also just that, Marxism without local variation. The compartmentalism of these "boxes," he thought, had to be "overcome" in a highly conscious and sober-minded manner: thus a "planned," rather than a natural syncretism. The instrument at hand for the task of "overcoming" was to be a broad and deep nationalism. Marhaenism-I suspect that it was no accident that the term almost rhymed with Marxism-was always described by him as Marxism adapted to Indonesia's unique conditions. These ideas were launched at the "perfect time." The PKI was in ruins after its failed rebellion against 5 Calling for Indonesia to become an Islamic state, this rebellion, centered in West Java and the western fringe of Central Java, lasted from 1948 to 1963.
6
Tjikini Affair: a deadly grenade attack on Soekarno on November 30, 1957 while he was visiting his children's school in the Tjikini neighborhood of Jakarta. The President himself escaped unharmed, but eleven people, mostly school children died, and thirty others were seriously wounded. Later, a group of Islamic radicals, mostly from Bima on the island of Sumbawa, were tried and convicted for the outrage. 7 Elected in 1955, the Assembly was supposed to draw up a permanent new constitution for Indonesia, but its work was paralyzed by conflicts between the major Islamic parties and the National Party, the Communist Party, and the various Christian minority parties. In this grand endeavor, Bung Kamo was lucky enough to get a windfall from Miss Suppose-That. In the 1930s President Manuel Quezon of the Philippines bemoaned the fact that 150 kilometers north of Manila, he needed an interpreter to talk to the local Ilocano-speaking voters. When he came to power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung's radio speeches could not be understood by the majority of the Chinese people, because he used Mandarin (the language of Peking and its environs) with a thick Hunan accent. Mahatma Gandhi had exactly the same experience. But in the Dutch East Indies, things were very different. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the VOC was too stingy, and in the nineteenth century The Netherlands was too poor, too small, and too unimportant, to impose the Dutch language on the Archipelago, in the way that English was imposed on Big India, and French on Senegal and the Ivory Coast. For these reasons, from early on the colonialists used a pidginized Malay as the administrative language throughout the areas they controlled. At the end of the nineteenth century this pidgin was increasingly standardized to fit the needs of modem schooling for the natives. Meanwhile, a kind of bazaar Malay was developing speedily in the world of the press, pioneered by Eurasians and peranakan Chinese (who were the true pioneers of modem Indonesian literature). Although there were also newspapers and magazines which used various regional languages, including Javanese, by the time Bung Kamo graduated from his HBS high school, Malay was coming out decisively on top both within the bureaucratic apparatus and in the open market. Still better, and even more "by chance," this victorious language was not the personal property of any major ethnic group in the Archipelago. Hence it was very easy for it to become the National Language (that is, if the role of Grandfather VOC could be forgotten). "By chance" again, among Bung Karo's many talents none was more characteristic than his gift for oratory. Thus he endeavored with all his powers to take advantage of this windfall from the Goddess of History to spread the national language in every direction of the compass; and, simultaneously, with alluring, exciting, humorous, and heart-rending words, to invite the natives to transform themselves and their consciousness and thus to become members of the new Indonesian nation. With his resonant sweet voice Bung Kamo demonstrated his love for his fellow-Indonesians (not for the natural resources of their respective ancestral lands), and also asked them to love him as their leader and the spokesman of their aspirations. Since this voice could be heard even by the illiterate majority of the natives, national solidarity grew ever wider and stronger. One might therefore say that Bung Kamo was the perfect leader for the age of radio.
During the two decades between what white people1 like to call The First and The Second World War, it became very evident that in South and Southeast Asia there was a critical difference between the policies of the English-speaking imperialists and those of the users of French and Dutch. In Uncle Sam's Philippines, a cacique democracy, run by oligarchs on the basis of an electoral system with a highly restricted suffrage, began to be established as early as the 1900s. By the 1930s there was already an (Eurasian) president, and independence was promised for 1945. In Big India-which till the middle 1930s included Burma-elections were already institutionalized and the seeds of democracy quite widely sown. After Burma was separated from Big India in 1937, three successive natives became Prime Minister before the country was invaded by the armies of Hirohito. Although London had made as yet no promises of independence, a trend in that direction was quite apparent. On the other hand, in The Netherlands Indies and in French Indochina there were no meaningful elections, and both had become police states, in which eventual independence was the last thing on the colonial rulers' minds. As a result both zones became fertile fields for the idea of "revolution," and for political activity both outside colonial law and also underground. 14 Here I used the teenage slang term "kuper," short for "kurang pergaulan" referring to a kid who doesn't get around much. '5 The half-Turkish Westerling, a paratrooper famous for his brutalities, killed thousands of people in early 1946 in order to stamp out local resistance. 16 As a result of American pressure, West Papua was "temporarily" excluded from the overall agreement on the transfer of sovereignty over the Netherlands Indies to the government of Indonesia, produced by the Round Table Conference In the last years of his rule, one could sense that the subterranean influence of Javanese kingly traditions was steadily growing. This was not just a matter of the multiplication of ostentatiously pompous state ceremonies. In former times, a king was regarded as a unique figure who had personally received the wahju [a ball of mysterious light said to descend on the head of a man destined to be king] from God or Gods; in no way was he merely primus inter pares. And if the wahju stayed with him, the king would automatically become king-for-life. During the Revolution, Bung Karno was still loved as primus inter pares. But afterwards, over time, most of the comrades-in-arms of his generation were marginalized or marginalized themselves. In the end, alas, he was willing to be appointed-by a Provisional MPR whose members he had appointed himself-as President-for-Life: one hundred percent outside the Constitution of 1945.
Perhaps it was as early as this juncture that the knell sounded for his time of triumphs: a president-for-life can only be removed by the Angel Gabriel18 or by human violence. But what happened after Indonesia joined the UN and Dutch imperialism was finally kaput'9? With the burden and threat of Dutch dominance gone, Indonesians were finally in a position to manage their collective affairs and to face each other at all levels of society. If we may borrow a famous expression of Bung Hatta, alongside persatuan (unity) there now appeared persatean (perhaps, disunity, fragmentation).20 It goes without saying that this problem did not escape Bung Karno's attention, all the more so in that the young nation-state immediately experienced a series of regional rebellions, almost all of which were led by people who had earlier been active in the nationalist movement and/or the Revolution.
The methods adopted by Bung Karno to overcome these post-independence difficulties are of great interest. In my judgment at least, his decisions were more based on his own earlier experiences and his interpretation of his own multiple roles than on any deep, serious reflection concerning the new situation. For simplicity's sake these methods can be divided into three categories.
The first was to stress the need for an old-style "national-unity" nationalism in the face of external threats: the Dutch, the British, the Americans, and, on a lesser scale, the Malaysians. One can't deny the reality of these threats-within specific limits and in specific instances. But denouncingm the Darul Islam and the Republic of the South Moluccas as "merely" puppets of the Dutch, or the PRRI-Permesta as "merely" puppets of the UK and the USA meant closing the eyes to the concrete dissatisfactions of large numbers of Indonesians with the policies of their government. Joining an armed rebellion is not a decision lightly taken-the risks involved are substantial. And if some of these rebels received arms and training from foreigners, the same could be said of the Center. In fact, thousands of officers from the army, the navy, the air force, and the police were trained overseas, and almost all their weaponry came from America or the Soviet Union. Rashly denouncing one's political adversaries as "traitors" and "puppets" does not only make a good resolution of conflicts much harder, but also, in fact, diminishes the stretch of nationalism itself. By this time, alas, not all Indonesians were "real" Indonesians any more. Persatean, in fact.
The second and third were actually tied together in a subterranean fashion. During the 1950s, at least until the Tjikini Affair, Bung Kamo was very diligent about visiting parts of his country that he had never seen before with his own eyes. In this way he experienced directly the enormous heterogeneity of his people. He was also fully aware that in this vast country there was no "majority"-in terms of ethnicity, ideology, mother-tongue, or religious commitment. But-and here is the third method-Bung Karno worked in his own way to ensure that some of the useful functions of a federal system (e.g. protecting small minorities) were performed. Himself without racial prejudices, he tried to make sure that Indonesians of Chinese descent had appropriate representation in all civil political institutions right up to the cabinet level. He gave his blessing to, and defended, Baperki, which wanted to have Sino-Indonesians accepted as another among all the different Indonesian ethnic groups. He protected and gave opportunities to the religious minorities too: the adherents of Balinese-style Hinduism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and mysticisms and animisms of different kinds. But exactly there lay 21 Here I used the acronym turba, which encapsulates turun and bawah. The allusion is to one famous slogan of the late Soekarno period, borrowed directly from Maoist lingo. "Going down" meant that students and party elites ought to spend time working with poor peasants to understand their problems and help them solve them, as well as to cleanse themselves of big city pretensions and life-styles. the difficulty. These groups had to be protected; they had no permanent rights of their own. They were dependent on His Excellency, just as the peasant "little people" had once been dependent on wise Sultans. What all this boiled down to was: these groups were not protected by the law or by the constitution, but only by the person of Bung Karo, who one day would be summoned by his Maker. After he was gone, who or what would protect them then? Why did he operate this way? Many factors surely played a role, including his allergy to federalism and his fusion of the role of head-of-state + great leader + maharaja.
But probably most fundamental of all was that he had become the victim of his own proud past. After Indonesia became independent, she needed new forms of leadership and a new style of nationalism. Most likely it was precisely his past successes that led Bung Karno to forget this lesson.
The same pattern can be seen in Bung Karno's attitude toward "revolution." Under the conditions of Dutch colonialism, and with Lenin's dictum to hand that the colonies were the weak link in the global imperialist system, it was natural to understand the concept of "revolution" as the uniting of the entire people to destroy Dutch colonialism within the framework of the emancipation of all the peoples of Asia and Africa, indeed of the whole world. It was for this reason that in 1950, after the transfer of sovereignty, Bung Hatta stated that "the [national] revolution is over." (Not only in Indonesia: by the mid-1970s virtually all the weak-link colonies in the world had become members of the United Nations). But Bung Karno would not accept this. He was very proud of the Indonesian Revolution and had no wish to see "revolution" honorably buried as one now-completed task-era in Indonesia's history .
So? The Leninist legacy of his youth impelled him to continue contributing to the global movement of emancipation: but without a firm and steady compass to guide him. For a time he was among the preeminent leaders of the "neutral and independent" bloc between the American bloc and that of the Soviet Union and China: thus "inbetween" the revolutionary states and the counterrevolutionary states. In colonial times, his comrades in this bloc had all been courageous people. But after independence? Nasser and Nkrumah created dictatorships built on lunatic cults of personality, terrorized their competitors, and finally died in despair, with their former reputations in ruins. U Nu also built a personality cult around himself, tore the Burmese economy and democratic political system to shreds, and was eventually overthrown by the military. And even though "Marshal" Tito was the one leader in the group who had really been a revolutionary activist in the classical sense, the impending failure of his regime was also perceptible before he died. At the same time, it would not be fair to say that Bung Kamo did nothing to transform the social-economic structures inherited from the colonial period. Yet, generally speaking, all of his endeavors failed, partly because of his own imprudence, and some even boomeranged against him. The nationalization of all Dutch enterprises at the end of 1957-when Indonesia was already under martial law-was not only carried out hastily and without adequate planning, but resulted in all the most advanced sectors of the Indonesian economy falling willy-nilly into the hands of the army. Thereafter, the trade unions in these advanced sectors were paralyzed by the new bosses, and the enterprises themselves were typically so mismanaged that their productivity fell like a stone thrown into a well, to say nothing of the quiet looting of their assets by crooked officers. Indonesia's economic disaster in the 1960s actually began in December 1957. "Supposing that" the nationalizations had been carried out gradually and in a well-planned way during the liberal democratic period, would their consequences have been so tragic?
The Agrarian and Crop-sharing Laws of 1960-61 had the excellent goals of eliminating big landlords, distributing land to rural laborers, and enforcing a fair division of harvests between tenants and landowners. But crucial exceptions were made for: 1.) the very extensive tanah lungguh (appanage land) attached to village headmanship from feudal times; and 2.) land owned by religious institutions. Plenty of people owning acreage above the new legal limit transferred the excess land to religious bodies (on the boards of which they often sat). The unanticipated result was that in the grave agricultural crisis of the early 1960s, the identification of big landownership with religious institutions (Islamic, Christian, and Hindu-Balinese) grew perilously strong. The national leadership also failed to consider the timing of the new laws. By then inflation was beginning to soar out of control, and the value of the rupiah fell week by week. People no longer had any confidence in the currency and hurried to get hold of concrete "goods," including land, instead. This behavior was particularly rife among bureaucrats who felt that their fixed, monetary salaries had lost most of their value. Especially officials in the ministries of the interior and of agrarian affairs, as well in the public prosecution, the police and the army, moved quietly to expand the acreage they owned and to block any serious endeavor to enforce the laws. It is necessary also to emphasize very strongly that incessantly using fiery "revolutionary" rhetoric unaccompanied by practical, concrete, and well-thought-out policies for achieving this rhetoric's stated goals was like revving up a motor car's engine to maximum speed without putting it into gear. The engine gets burning hot, but the car does not move. Towards the end of Guided Democracy the atmosphere in Indonesia was getting more and more heated, while the sedan brand-named Progress, let alone the pickup brand-named Revolution, stalled and broke down. This spectacularly visible contrast increasingly eroded Bung Karo's authority. The "prorevolution" groups grew more and more frustrated at the lack of concrete progress, while for the "antis" the specter of revolution aroused deeper and deeper panic and fury. Did Bung Kamo really understand this situation? This is not an easy question to answer. But it is equally difficult to avoid the conclusion that if Bung Kamo was a great leader in the era of Revolution for Independence, which exploded from below, quite outside the calculations of the Nationalist Movement's elite, he absolutely cannot be called a Great Leader of (The) Revolution fullstop.
In the too lengthy analysis above, I have tried to understand Bung Kamo as a man of his time-a time that has long passed-not to praise him or to condemn him either. The Father of the Indonesian Nation is today immune both to praise and blame. He was shaped by his birth, by his education, by the history of the Netherlands Indies, and the history of the modem world: also by the sweet and bitter experiences of his youth. Yet in the end all these factors cannot explain why this HBS and ITB graduate made the decision to become a fighter for his country's freedom (at a time when the Dutch colonial state seemed so powerful and so permanent) rather than a quiet, successful professional architect. After the horrors of the Orde Babibuta,22 it may be too easy to say: "Well, at least he was never tortured, his wife was never raped, and his children were never socially ostracized as anak haram politik.23 Nor was the property he owned ever seized." All this is true enough, but he was spied on, menaced, slandered, ridiculed, tried by a sort of colonial Mahmilub,24 and lost his freedom for almost ten years. If Japan had not overrun the Netherlands Indies, his internment could 22 Babibuta, literally "blind boar," means to "rage savagely." This is my riff on Orde Babe, the standard slang term for Suharto's Orde Baru. 23 Here I make an oblique allusion to Pramoedya's famous short story "Anak Haram." The term usually means "illegitimate child," but Pramoedya used it to refer to the ostracized status of a young boy whose father had been a collaborator with the Dutch. 24 In all this are there any useful lessons to be learned for our own time? Perhaps there at least two. The first is the danger of fossilization. If there is some truth in my lengthy analysis, the conclusion can be drawn that with respect to Bung Karno's attitudes and thinking the fossilization process began with Bung Karno himself once Indonesia had become independent and he had become president. By stages, of course. And after his death, this fossilization has only increased apace, under clouds of incense. Such a conclusion does not mean that Bung Karno's views and values are totally out of date. It simply means that his thinking needs to be considered in a critical (not hostile) spirit, on the basis of a historical awareness of the distance between his time and our own. The Borobudur, the largest and maybe the most beautiful Buddhist stupa in the world, is today a source of pride for the Indonesian people. But today's Indonesian society is no longer Buddhist. The Buddhism which inspired the creators of the Borobudur more than a millennium ago interests almost no one in the Archipelago today. Yet the stupa's grandeur, its beauty, and the solemnity that surrounds it still inspire and awe.
Treating the writings of Bung Karno as a Holy Book (like the Bible or the Koran) or as Sacred Ancestral Teachings makes impossible any deep and relevant thinking about the problems facing Indonesia today: creating social justice in the era of globalization and computerization; developing a healthy federal system in which Bhinneka and Eka do not have knives at each others' throats; finding alternatives to the savagery of neoliberalism, the octopus-grip of gigantic "transnational" corporations, and the nihilism of Hollywood; stopping the destruction of the environment; providing protection for minorities; securing human rights, and, still more important, the rights of Indonesians as citizens of Indonesia; battling the total rot in the country's legal system; and so many more. For most of these problems, no answers will be found in The Teachings of Bung Karno. Times have changed so much, so fast.
To the contrary, fossilization opens the door wide to manipulation and deception. Second: From Bung Karo and his time we can disinter the seeds of a vitally needed form of nationalism, not as an heirloom inherited from the ancestors, but as a political commitment in the present and for the future. It is true that he often spoke facilely about 350 years of Dutch colonialism, though he knew perfectly well that at the time of his own birth Atjeh, South Bali, and most of South Sulawesi had yet to be subjected to imperialist control. It is likely, however, that he used such language to make his listeners feel ashamed, and because of this sense of shame, feel prodded into action. He knew just as well that even Kartini, dying so young, had no opportunity to feel herself an Indonesian woman. Bung Karo's generation was the first to imagine itself as "Indonesian." Thus being Indonesian was (and is) not something "natural" or biological, but was (and is) something created by modem history, and demands determination, solidarity, a willingness to make sacrifices, and hope. Above all, hope. The "Indonesian" imagined by the National Movement was a human being who stood up straight, didn't grovel to, and didn't trample on, anyone, and was open-minded, dynamic, inclusive, steadfast in adversity, and with sympathy for all mankind. A human being of this kind is not a creature who appears in the world "naturally," but needs to be trained, day in day out, both by him-or herself, and by his or her fellow human beings. This, I think, is the most important of those "lessons" from Bung Kamo that are still fresh and relevant for his countrymen. And: an unbreakable optimism, even amidst ruin. Requiescas in Pace, Bung Kamo.
